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CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N. 
·1. A New Era Begins 
Monday night, October 25, 1971, the United Nations, in a surprisingly swift series of 
events entered a new era of its history. With a seldom seen speed, over twenty years of 
tension concerning the admission of the People's Republic of China was resolved. Only one 
week after debate had formally opened on the issue for the twenty-first time, the 
Communist government of China was declared the only representative of the Chinese people 
to that world assembly. 
The tempo of the maneuvering on the issue had quickened during the week of debate 
until the General Assembly was going at almost a dead run into the voting of the 25th. It 
was literally an eleventh hour vote which admitted the Peking government, but in the 
strange way that politics is done, it was really two other votes on procedural matters in the 
earlier evening that settled the issue. 
As the week of debate had been going on, the United States delegation was busy off 
the floor lining up support for its compromise plan of admitting Peking but not expelling 
the Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek based in Taipei, Taiwan. For the 
first proposition there was no problem. It was evident that there would be a large m'\iority 
in favor of seating the Peking government. However, there was considerable difficulty over 
retaining the membership of the Taipei government. To do so had at least two major 
disadvantages: 1) it would recognize two governments as representing the Chinese people, 
and 2) more importantly, both these governments had repeatedly affirmed that they could 
not co-exist in the United Nations. The consequence was that the United States was having a 
hard time lining up support to keep the Taiwanese Chinese in the General Assembly. 
Monday morning, the 25th, as debate resumed after the weekend, it seemed that the 
vote would come some time Tuesday. The Albanian delegation, which was leading the floor 
fight for entrance of Peking and expulsion of Taipei, apparently had decided over the 
weekend that a faster moving timetable would be to their advantage. By mid-afternoon 
Monday it was widely rumored that the vote would come that evening rather than the next 
day as expected. At about 6 p.m. the Saudi Arabian delegation proposed a motion which 
would have had the effect of postponing all voting on the issue of Chinese representation 
until Tuesday. That motion was narrowly defeated by a 56 to 53 vote with 19 abstentions. 
This defeat set the stage for the climax of the issue in the late hours of Monday night. 
The hope of the United States was to split the issue, thereby having separate votes on 
the admission of Peking and the expulsion of Taipei. Since there was probably only a slight 
majority of members in favor of expelling the Nationalist government, the United States 
sought to have this declared an "important question," thus requiring a two-thirds majority 
for expulsion. The Americans won a minor but necessary victory by getting the vote to split 
the issue scheduled before the main vote on Red Chinese admission. However, at 
mid-evening when that vote was finally taken, it, too, was narrowly defeated, 59-55, with 15 
abstentions. 
This all but settled the matter. So clear was the final outcome that the Nationalist 
government's delegation walked out of the General Assembly and was not present to vote 
against its own expulsion. That vote just before midnight was 76 in favor, 35 opposed, 17 
abstentions. And with that vote a new era of United Nations history was begun. 

The unanswered question, of course, was what the changed relationships of the new 
era would be. Apart from the effects upon the United Nations itself, effects were felt 
outside the world body as well. In some places, it seemed, the aftershock might continue for 
some time. 
The immediate reaction, though, was swift and in some quarters sharp. Chiang 
Kai-shek announced that the unseating of his Nationalist delegation was an "illegal action." 
The Russians said that the vote had been "a triumph of common sense." The Chinese 
Communists themselves made little overt reaction. But in the United States the reaction was 
the strongest of anywhere in the world, with the possible exception of Japan. 
Tuesday morning following the vote Secretary of State William P. Rogers made a few 
remarks to the press. He, of course, welcomed Peking into the United Nations, but most of 
the conference time was spent on the expulsion of Taipei, which Rogers saw as "a mistake 
of major proportion." Within a day, President Nixon let it be known through his press 
secretary that he was considerably less than happy with the jubilant reaction on the floor of 
the General Assembly following the vote. As the New York Times reported it: 
Mr. Ziegler, who was obviously well primed and who spoke from 
notes compiled during a conversation with Mr. Nixon early in the day, told 
newsmen at his regular morning briefing that the President had found the 
behavior offensive and undignified and had warned that it "could very 
seriously impair support for the United Nations in the country and in the 
Congress." ... 
Mr. Ziegler said the Administration did not intend to retaliate against 
I 
the nations involved, but he said the President feared that the "spectacle" 
might "affect foreign aid allocations." 1 
Two days later the President's remarks had become a reality. The administration's 
foreign aid authorization bill, which had been up for debate in the Senate, was voted down, 
leaving not only the "nations involved," but all other countries as well without American 
aid. The ending of all American aid to foreign countries was clearly a temporary one. Within 
tw·o weeks the Senate was considering several new approaches to the problem. However, the 
old style foreign aid program stemming from the Marshall Plan days after World War II was 
clearly finished--the first casualty of the United Nations China vote. Beyond the question of 
general foreign aid, there was another question: what would be the future willingness of the 
Congress to vote financial support to the United Nations itself? At present the United States 
is paying almost one-third of all the United Nations' expenses. These funds have already 
been appropriated through the 1972 fiscal year, but it is an open question as to whether 
they will continue at that level. 
There was also the possibility that the shock wave following the vote could play an 
important part in toppling the government of Japan. Premier Eisaku Sato was already 
treading on thin ice with many of his constituents because of his extremely close 
cooperation with the United States. Several American moves just prior to the United 
Nations vote had made that cooperation even less popular. Among them were America's 
floating of the dollar which endangered the value of the Japanese yen, the imposition of a 
ten per cent import charge and import quotas, and the announcement of a presidential trip 
1 New York Times, October 28, 1971; 1:6. 
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to Peking without prior consultation with the Japanese government. Now the United States 
had pressured Japan to be on what ended up as the losing side in a critically important vote. 
The Japanese position on China is a much In ore central issue to them politically since they 
are the other major power with China on the East Asian scene: 
Outside of China and perhaps the United States, the impact of the 
United Nations decision appeared to be felt hardest in Japan, America's · 
major ally in East Asia and Communist China's chief rival for influence in 
the region. 
Premier Eisaku Sato was subjected to a bitter attack by the four 
opposition parties, by labor unions, many businessmen, and some members 
of his own party for having sided with the United States in a losing cause. 
Many called for his immediate resignation.2 
While two immediate votes of no confidence in the Sato government were defeated in the 
Japanese Diet, the overall effect has surely been to weaken both the position of Premier 
Sato and the possibilities for close cooperation with the United States, at least for the 
immediate future. 
A major effect of the vote outside of the United Nations is its impact on the 
Nationalist government of Taipei. If, in fact, it is harder for them to carry on the image of 
the exiled, but true, government of the mainland, will the self-determination. movement 
already present among the 12 million Taiwanese grow into a pronounced threat to the 
Nationalists? 
Stanley Karnow, writing in the Washington Post, proposed another effect when he 
advanced the thesis that the long run aims of the Nixon Doctrine, that is, "the President's 
formula for reducing the United States commitment to Asia," will be advanced by the 
United Nations' action. He gives three reasons for this: 1) the lessening influence of Chiang 
Kai-shek will leave a less complicated and less tense Asian scene, 2) there is some evidence 
that the Chinese are encouraging the North Koreans to moderate their hard-line stance 
toward South Korea and the United States, and 3) "Peking's rise to the role of a recognized 
international power could contribute to the settlement in Indochina."3 
As for the effects within the United Nations itself, here the matter is even less well 
defined, nor is that definition likely to emerge immediately. The Peking government does 
not come to the United Nations as merely another member, however. It comes as one of the 
five major members of that body. Besides its seat in the General Assembly, China will be a 
member of the more select and powerful Security Council. In fact, it will be one of the five 
permanent members of that group (along with the U.S.S.R., France, Britain, and the U.S.). 
Thus, China will be given veto power over most of the truly important United Nations 
actions. As James Reston observed: 
much will depend now on how Chou En-lai and his associates in Peking 
react to China's new responsibilities as one of the five permanent members 
of the U.N. S~curity Council-whether they accept the vote as invitation to 
help in the peaceful settlement of world disputes-the main purpose of the 
U.N.--or whether they attempt to use the U.N. as an instrument of their 
own national ambitions and of world revolution.4 
2 Ibid., October 27, 1971; 1 :5. 
3 Washington Post, October 27, 1971; 1:6, Al6:5. 
4 New York Tirnes, October 27, 1971; 45:1. 
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Charles W. Yost, former United States ambassador to the United Nations, has an 
opinion about how the Chinese will decide to use those new responsibilities: 
It is sometimes claimed that the introduction into the Security Council, as 
a permanent member with a veto, of a state having a view of the world so 
alien to that of the majority of UN members, so alien even to that of the 
Soviet Union, would cripple the Council and bring to a halt even the sadly 
insufficient peacemaking and peacekeeping ,enterprises in which it now 
engages. This of course might just be what would happen. 
My judgment would be, however, that the PRC [People's Republic of 
China] is acutely aware of this suspicion and expectation on the part of 
many UN members, that it would be clever enough initially to surprise 
them by displaying in the UN the urbanity and tact characteristic of Chou 
En-lai, and that over the longer run the Thoughts of Mao Tse-'tung would 
prove no more irreconcilable with the UN Charter than the less explicitly 
formulated "thoughts" of other great powers and many small ones. 5 
John Steward Service, United States liaison to the Chinese Communists at the end of 
World War II and presently on the staff of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University 
of California, Berkeley, was invited to China by Chou En-lai some five weeks previous to the 
vote. He talked with the Premier after that vote and later reported to the press: 
I have the impression that they don't plan to cut any wide swath. 
They probably will approach it all very moderately for the time being. 6 
Not everyone would agree with this. Benjamin Schwartz, Harvard China expert , is 
quoted in Time magazine as expecting them to come to the United Nations and "to speak 
quite toughly." 7However, .another Harvard expert, James C. Thomson, indicated that it may 
not be as simple as moderation or toughness: 
\ 
We have never seen China in such circumstances. China's ingenuity will be 
taxed when it has to deal simultaneously with the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Japan, Poland, Albania. This is a mixed cast and requires a new kind 
of orchestration. 8 
An unnamed United Nations official, quoted in the same Time article, goes on to add: 
We have to face the fact that the Chinese probably will not accept the rules 
of the game as they have been established. They may even weaken the 
Security Council and the U.N. temporarily. Chinese entry is good and 
necessary, but it will create more problems than it solves, at least at first.9 
Two things that should definitely happen within the United Nations would be, first, a 
new burst of activity as the entrance of Mainland China allows a new perspective on and 
new initatives toward old problems. Secondly, there will be a readjustment of the present 
alignment of nations as the government of the world's most populous nation begins to 
develop a sphere of influence. 
5 Vista , VII (Sept.-Oct., 1971)49. 
6 Washington Post, October 29, 1971; A22: I. 
7 Time, November 7, 1971, p. 31. 
8 Ibid. , p. 3 1. 
9 Ibid., p. 3 1. 
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To indicate the kind of subtle power that China will wield, they stopped one m'\ior 
Soviet initiative cold before they even arrived. In early November, the U.S.S.R. hoped to get 
approval for its proposed wo;ld disarmament conference. Instead, they met a wall of silence. 
Almost no one among the delegates was willing to have any discussion carried on concerning 
such a major issue before the delegation from Peking made its arrival. 
By mid-November the delegation had arrived and taken its seat. However, at that 
point only five weeks remained in the session. That five weeks may provide only a marginal 
indication of what role the Chinese will play. Instead, it may function as a crucial period of 
learning for the Chinese as they begin to juggle many new relationships simultaneously and 
as they begin to test out their new world role. One barometer of their influence in the 
United Nations could be the selection of a new Secretary-General. With U Thant retiring, a 
new man must be chosen by December 31, 1971. What better way for the Chinese to 
demonstrate their influence and insure their position than to play a strong role in the 
selection of his replacement? 
Having seen the circumstances of this momentous change and the prospects which it 
has for the future, it is important to examine the changes which took place within the 
United States leading up to our shift in policy on the admission of the Peking government to 
the United Nations. Not only is this important background for a more complete 
understanding of the change itself, but it is also an illuminating case study of the interplay 
between the making of foreign policy and the nature of the domestic climate. Former 
ambassador Yost notes that President Kennedy seriously considered this same move for 
United States policy in 1961, "but found opposition to any change, from the 'China Lobby' 
·and others, still so entrenched and articulate that he decided not to risk a costly domestic 
battle." 10 This growing climate of change toward China in general and its admission to the 
United Nations in particular, then, will be the topic of our second unit. 
( 
10 Vista, VII (Sept.- Oct., 1971) 16. 
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CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N.: A New Era Begins 
Discussion Questions 
1. The materials in this unit are current up to the time that the Peking delegation was 
seated in the General Assembly. From November 15, 1971, they have been able to be an 
active part of the work of the United Nations. In view of that fact, discuss the following: 
Try to generate a sort of listing of the United Nations activities of the Peking government 
since it was seated. What instances have come to your attention? What m(ijor things do . 
you remember them as having done since joining the United Nations? 
What is your impression of the Chinese contribution so far? In general, do you see them 
as having strengthened or weakened the world body? Why, and on what do you base 
your estimate? 
Have you been made aware of their influence in the United Nations? Do the Chinese 
seem to be exerting a significant influence? Remember that the materials we have seen 
give at least three areas in which this influence can be discussed: 1) selection of a new 
Secretary-General in December, 1971, 2) the ability of the United Nations to pursue new 
and more active approaches to some old problems, and 3) the development of a Chinese · 
sphere of influence among the 131 member nations. 
2. The materials presented also indicate that there were many effects flowing from the 
expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese. The main questions raised in the days following the 
expulsion seemed to be these. 
With regard to the United States: 
How would it affect our relations with other countries? 
How would it affect our support of the United Nations? 
Would it help or hinder our-attempts to disengage from an active role in Asia? 
With regard to Japan: 
Would the stability of the Sato government be greatly affected? 
Would Japanese-American relations become more strained? 
With regard to Taiwan: 
Would the Nationalist minority there be able to continue effective control of the 
island? 
What would be the island's relationship to the mainland? 
How has the passage of time affected these issues? Have there been any other effects 
which you consider important? If so, enumerate them. In retrospect, does the expulsion 
of the Taipei government seem to have been a far-reaching decision, or only cause for 
temporary excitement? Why? 
3. From what sources do you receive your information about United Nations activities and 
the behavior of the Communist Chinese in the U.N.? Could those sources have any 
influence on the way in which you have answered questions one and two? If so, what 
biases might be present and what influences might these sources have had? 
6 

CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N. 
II. The Background: Twenty Years of Growing Toward A Change 
In the Spring of 1971 an American ping-pong team touring in Japan went into Red 
China through what seemed to many the first crack in "the bamboo curtain." Within three 
months the President of the United States was announcing to the nation that he would be 
visiting the Chinese mainland personally some time before May of 1972. 
To the average citizen on the street this all seemed a very abrupt change in 
American-Chinese relations. Within a matter of only weeks, it seemed, we had moved from a 
frozen and uncompromising, hard line to a much softer, "let's talk about our differences" 
.appro_ach. As is so often the case in matters political, however, the abruptness was on the 
surface. At a deeper level gradual change had been taking place. ( 
In between the two events that we have mentioned, there occured a third item in the 
news which reflected this gradual change. It was the filing of the final report of the 
President's Commission for the Observance of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United 
I 
Nations. One of the duties of this commission was to comment on American policy toward 
major United Nations concerns. In so doing, they naturally took up the question of who 
should be a member of the United Nations. Obviously the most crucial specific under that 
general heading was the question: Should the People's Republic of China (i.e. Communist 
China) be admitted to the United Nations? 
To answer the first and more general question, the commission recommended that 
" the United States adopt the position that all firmly established governments should be 
included in the UN system ... "lin answer to the specific question of Mainland China's 
admission the report observed: 
The Commission has found growing public support in the United 
States for the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the work of 
the United Nations. There is also a deep American commitment to the 
continued representation of the Republic of China on Taiwan in the 
UN ... 
The Commission recommends that under no circumstances should 
the United States agree to the expulsion of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan from the UN, but that the United States seek agreement as early as 
practicable whereby the People's Republic of China tnight accept the 
principles of the UN Charter and be represented in the organization) 
But, while the recommendation is rather straight forward, its implementation was not 
to be. The President's Commission had recommended the politically impossible. Let the 
Mainland Chinese government enter the United Nations, but not at the expense of expelling 
Nationalist China. No such compromise was possible in the end. 
- - - -- -
Report of the President's Commission for the Observance of the Twenty-Fifth 
Anniversary of the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1971), p. 35. 
2 Ibid. , pp. 35-36. 
r 

There had been a continuing struggle in the United Nations over the admission of the 
People's Republic of China since 1950. The other Communist countries, largely through the 
instrumentality of the Albanian government, had been continuous in bringing the matter up. 
The United States, for its part, had been continuous in its resistance to Communist China's 
admission. Yet, throughout the decade of the Sixties there was a gradual lessening in 
support for the United States position. This was reflected first in a long term rise in the 
percentage of United Nations members voting for Communist China's admission as 
successive votes were taken. 3Itwas also reflected in the growing number of United States 
citizens who began to raise questions about the policy of keeping the Mainland Chinese out 
of the United Nations. 
Lines seen1ed quite clear in the 1950's. True, there were mixed reactions in the 
Truman administration to the fall of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, but by the time of the 
Korean war in 1950 the United States felt strongly committed to the government on 
Taiwan. This was so much the case that in late 1954 the Eisenhower adtninistration was 
willing to risk the development of a very touchy international situation of several months 
duration over Nationalist Chinese forces on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. This 
same difficult point arose and subsided again in 1958. 
In the early Sixties the American relationship to Mainland China became a part of the 
developing crisis in Vietnam. In the beginning years of that crisis our aim seemed clearly to 
be the containment of the Chinese as they sought to extend their influence into Southeast 
Asia. It would most probably be a fair generalization to say that as national attitudes toward 
the war in Vietnam changed, so did the American attitudes toward the Mainland Chinese 
and especially toward having them as a part of the international community through United 
Nations participation. As it was summed up by A. Doak Barnett, professor of govenunent 
and acting director of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University: 
For almost 17 years we [the United States] have pursued a policy that 
might best be characterized as one aimed at containment and isolation of 
Communist China. 
In my view, the element of containment--using this term in a very 
broad sense to include both military and nonmilitary measures to block 
threats posed by China to its neighbors--has been an essential part of our 
policy and has been, in some respects at least, fairly successful. ... But the 
U.S. attempt to isolate Communist China has been, in my opinion, unwise 
and, in a fundamental sense, unsuccessful, and it cannot, I believe, provide 
a basis for a sound, long-term policy that aims not only at containing and 
restraining Chinese power but also at reducing tensions, exerting a 
moderating influence on Peking, broadening the areas of non-Communist 
agreement on issues relating to China, and slowly involving Communist 
China in more normal patterns of international intercourse. 
I strongly believe, therefore, that the time has come--even though the 
United States is now engaged in a bitter struggle in Vietnam--for our 
country to alter its posture toward Communist China and adopt a policy of 
containment but not isolation, a policy that would aim on the one hand at 
checking military or subversive threats and pressures emanating from 
Peking, but at the same time would aim at maximum contacts with and 
maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international 
conununity. 4 
3 See Appendix I for a complete record of the vote on this issue: 1950-1971. 
4 Statement in hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States 
Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland 
China, March 8, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 4. 
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In retrospect, this oft-quoted statement seemed to sum up the direction United States 
policy would take. Given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966, it by no 
means represented a unanimous opinion. David Nelson Rowe, professor of political science 
at Yale U uiversity, for example, in a prepared statement submitted during these same 
hearings stated: 
On moral, legal, and constitutional grounds, Peking is ineligible for 
admission. It is an aggressor; its leading spokesmen, beginning with Mao 
Tse-tung, insist on their right to commit aggression so long as it advances 
their Communist, international, revolutionary aims. The United Nations 
Charter, on the other hand, clearly disqualifies an aggressor by stipulating 
that a candidate for membership must be a peace-loving state. 
The question must then be considered on what are called realistic 
grounds, The main argument is that Peking, once inside the United Nations 
and exposed to its civilizing, restraining influence, will be less aggr~ssive 
than if it remained outside the United Nations--an unhappy and rebellious 
outcast. 
Those who advance this argument forget one very crucial point. If 
Peking were admitted to the United Nations, it would become a permanent 
member of the Security Council. As such, it would acquire the power to 
veto any act by the Security Council (and, according to the Soviet view, by 
the General Assembly, too) which sought to promote peace by curing Red 
Chinese aggression. In other words, admission of Peking, in its present 
frame of mind, could vety well tie the hands of the United Nations and 
thereby advance, rather than inhibit, Red Chinese acts of aggression. 5 
Ishwer C. Ojha, in the book Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition, has 
referred to two approaches to China, the fundamentalist approach (as represented by Rowe, 
above) and the gradualist approach (as represented by Barnett above). 
The so-called "fundamentalists" who clung to this faith [in the Nationalist 
Chinese government] refused to permit the possibility of a major 
accommodation with the Chinese Communists under any 
circumstances . . . . 
A second broad category which has been gaining strength in the 
1960's is that of the so-called "gradualists." In contrast to the 
fundamentalists, gradualists believe that some concrete steps should be 
taken to ensure the eventual normalization of Sino-American relations.6 
In the mid-1960's even though United States policy toward China was very fixed, it 
was not seen as irrevocable. Dean Rusk, in a 1966 statement of policy toward Communist 
China, stated as his final point in the elements of future policy: "Tenth, we must continue 
to explore and analyze all available information on Communist China and keep our own 
policies up to date." A few sentences earlier he had inferred indirectly the same flexibility 
on Mainland China's membership in the United Nations: "So long as Peiping [Peking] 
follows its present course it is extremely difficult for us to see how it can be held to fulfill 
the requirements set forth in the charter for [United Nations] membership, and the United 
States opposes its membership."7 
5 Ibid . . March 28, 1966, p. 641. 
6 Ojha, Ishwer C. , Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1969). pp. 81 -83. 
7 United States Policy Toward Communist China (Washington: Government Ptinting Office, 
1966), pp. 9-10. 
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The implication of Secretary Rusk's remarks is Jhat "United States policy toward 
China is flexible to the extent that a favorable change in Chinese policies can cause, by way 
of reaction, a favorable change in American policy toward China. 
However, both President Nixon's July 15 announcement of his intention to visit 
Peking and Secretary of State William Rogers' August 2 statement that the United States 
would support the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, seem to 
echo a somewhat different reasoning. While the administration may i~ fact have noted some 
real changes in Peking's attitudes and policies, there was no mention of it in either 
statement. The dominant reasoning, rather, was a need to deal realistically with the world as 
it is. 
President Nixon said: 
The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to 
seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to 
exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides .... 
I have taken this action because of my profund conviction that all 
nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship 
between the United States and the People's Republic of China.8 ' 
Secretary Rogers said: 
The position of the United States is that if the United Nations is to 
succeed in its peacekeeping role, it must deal with the realities of the world 
in which we live. Thus, the United States will cooperate with those who, 
whatever their view of the status of the relationship of the two [Chinese] 
governments, wish to continue to have the Republic of China represented 
in the United Nations.9 
America's total policy toward China, then, had undergone an evolution. And with this 
evolution came a change in stance on the admission of Mainland China to the United 
. Nations. The long range effects of that shift in policy will take at least as much time, and 
probably as much difficulty, to work out as did the policy change itself. 
8 Quoted in Facts on File, XXXI (July 15-21, 1971), p. 541, and most major newspapers 
on July 16th, the day after the statement. 
9 Quoted in Facts on File, XXXI (July 29-Aug. 4, 1971), p. 581, and many major 
newspapers on August 2nd and 3rd. 
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CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE U.N.: THE BACKGROUND 
Discussion Questions 
1. Discuss to what extent you had thought about Chinese admission to the United Nations 
previous to the Spring of 1971. You may want to include other aspects of 
Chinese-American relations in the discussion as well, since they are so closely 
interconnected, but discuss at least the following points. 
To what extent can you remember having a firm opinion on the issue, during, say, the 
early 60's? 
To what extent did you discuss the issue or hear it discussed? 
How aware were you of the ongoing series of votes in the United Nations on this issue? 
What reaction did you have to those votes, and were you aware of any trend in the 
voting? 
Did your own opinion change during the 60's? If so, when? Why? 
How aware were you of other people's opinions on the issue during this time? Did you 
note any change? If so, what change? 
When we finally got to' the Spring and Summer of 1971, did the events we have discussed 
seem to you to be one more step in a series of smaller changes, or did they seem like a 
radical departure? Why? 
2. Explain the connection, as you see it, between domestic attitudes and foreign policy as 
exemplified in this instance. Discuss whether it would have been possible to change the 
foreign policy sooner. Discuss, for example, whether President Kennedy could have done 
it in 1961, when, according to former U.N. ambassador Yost, he seriously considered it. 
3. While the United States government has changed its position in this matter, there is still a 
truly discussible issue involved. While the statements in the text are more detailed and 
extensive, the matter put most simply comes to this: are the actions and attitudes of 
Mainland China such that it should have been excluded from the United Nations or 
would it have been better to have such a major power involved in the United Nations 
even if we perceive their actions to be contrary to the aims of the organization's charter? 
Here one must discuss at least three things: 
To what extent are our perceptions of the Mainland Chinese actions and attitudes 
accurate , at least to the extent that they are shared by most of the other United 
Nations members? 
What is the nature of the Uni
1
ted Nations and the meaning of membership in it? 
Based on the consensus of those two discussions, what about the specific case of 
seating Red China? 
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4. Discuss whether you think that there has been any real change on the Chinese side, a 
softening of their line, so to speak, that is cause for a change in American policy. Or on 
the other hand, do you think it is the Americans who have changed their attitude of how 
they want to handle the problem of our relations with China? 
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Appendix I 
U.N. Vote on Admission of Peking Government 
YEAR FOR AGAINST ABSTENSIONS 
1950 6 33 10 
1951 11 37 4 
1952 7 42 11 
1953 10 44 10 
1954 11 43 11 
1955 12 42 6 
1956 24 47 8 
1957 27 48 6 
1958 28 44 9 
1959 29 44 9 
1960 34 42 22 
1961 36 48 20 
1962 42 56 12 
1963 41 57 12 
1964 no vote 
1965 47 47 20 
1966 46 57 17 
1967 45 58 17 
1968 44 58 23 
1969 48 56 21 
1970 51 49 25 
1971 76 35 17 
Based on William L. Tung, China and the Foreign Powers.(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana 
Publications, 1970), p. 407. 

Appendix II 
Bibliography 
Ballantine,' J .W., Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1952. The author was a former staff member of the State 
Department. The book is an early but fair general summary. 
Barclay, George W., Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1954. Another book covering subject matter similar to Ballantine and 
dating from almost the same period. 
Barnett, A. Doak, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy. New York: 
Harper & Bros., 1960. The author is a long standing and widely recognized China expert. 
This book looks at the other side of the coin, U.S. policy toward the Mainland. 
Blum, Robert, The United States and China in World Affairs. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1966. The author was former president of the Asia Foundation and editor of the series 
of books of which the present is volume five. Finished after the author's death by A.D. 
Barnett, this book aims at a general discussion of the forces and attitudes affecting 
American policy. It also discusses alternative policies. 
Chen, Lung-chu and Harold Lasswell, Formosa, China and the United Nations: Formosa in · 
the World Community. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. A book rather directly on 
the topic from the less discussed point of view of Formosa and the United Nations. 
Congressional Service Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1966. Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1967. An interesting and useful reference source giving 
history, chronology, biography, and documents of interest on the topic. 
Dawson, Raymond, The Chinese Chameleon: An Analysis of European Conceptions of 
Chinese Civilizations. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1967. An enlightening book 
in view of th~ fact that mutual misperception is so much a part of relations between 
Eastern and Western cultures. The book looks at the various phases in the European 
perception of China. 
Fairbank, John King, China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1967. Also an attempt to bridge the gap of misconception, a 
missionary in reverse as Fair bank calls himself. He is also a long standing China specialist 
and faculty member at Harvard. 
---, The United States and China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. This is the 
third edition of what is basically a text book. It is probably the best and most up to date 
general background book generally available. Only marginally tangles with the political 
issues, however. Extensive suggested readings section on topics covered. 
Feis, Herbert, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the 
Marshall Mission. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 53. An historical piece 
covering the World War II years of the China problem. Gen. George C. Marshall went to 
China as President Truman's special ambassador in December of 1945. -
' 

Friedman, Edward and Mark Selden, eds., America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on 
Asian-American Relations. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971. A compilation of the 
dissenting views of young scholars. 
Greene, Fred, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. Treats 
security interests, Communist threats, and the element of nuclear capability on the Asian 
I 
scene. ' 
lriye, Akaira, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American East Asian Relations. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967. Gives a general overview and has a useful 
bibliography. 
--, US Policy Toward China, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968. An extensive 
excerpting and topical reordering of statements on China made during the Senate 
Foreign Relations hearings of 1966. May be available where a copy of the full hearings is 
not. 
Isaacs, Harold R., Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India. New York: 
John Day, 1958. Author is a journalist as well as a scholar. Book is published in 
paperback under the title Images of Asia. 
Jacoby, Neil H. , U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development. 
New York: Praeger, 1966. Background for understanding the U.S. commitment to the 
Nationalist government in very practical, dollar and cents terms. 
Kerr, George H., Formosa Betrayed. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965. Gives eye-witness and 
research account of the brutality with which the Nationalist government squelched the 
uprising on Taiwan in 1947. 
Koen, Ross Y ., The China Lobby . New York: Macmillan, 1960: Gets into the controversy 
over why China went Communist in 1949. This book may be difficult to find since it was 
withdrawn from circulation by the publisher. 
Kubek, Anthony, How the Far East was Lost, Americ;_an Policy and the Creation of 
Communist China, 1941-1949. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963. The account is somewhat 
onesided and typically what one would have found for an explanation in the McCarthy 
era of the early 195O's. 
Liu, Kwang-Ching, Americans and Chinese: A Historical Essay and a Bibliography. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Another good general background book on 
the general topic. 
McClellan , Robert, Heathen Chinese: The A merican image of China. Columbus: Ohio State 
U nivers.ity Press, 1971. A very recent book on the subject of misperception across the 
cultures. 
Mendel, Douglas, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1970. This book is largely a reporting from in the field of attitudes and opinions 
affecting the independence of Formosa. 

\ 
Ojha, lsher C., Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition. Boston : Beacon Press, 1969.-
As the ~uthor says: "This book tries to put contemporary China in the context of 
change, beginning with the failure of syncretism to meet the nineteenth-century 
challenge of the West ... When the effort to transplant institutions failed . .. the search 
for new values was born." 
Steele, Archibald, The American People and China. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. This 
book is a part of the same series as the Blum book and is another of those dealing with 
public opinion concerning the topic. . 
Thomson, James C., Jr. and Ernest R. May, eds., American-East Asian Relations: A Survey. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. This is another of the general works on the 
topic; very recent and with a great deal of reference to scholarly materials on the subject 
of American-Chinese relations. 
Tsou, Tang, America's Failure in China 1941-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1963. Again a book on the critical World War II years, but going on through the years of 
the communist takeover. 
-----, ed., China's Policies in Asia and America 's Alternatives. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968. The proceedings of a recent symposium on the subject. 
Tuchman, Barbara, Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-1945. New York: 
Macmillan, 1971 . Very recent and very readable. 
United Nations Association oL the United States of America, China, the United Nations and 
United States Policy. New York: UNA-USA, 1967. The 55 page work is the report of a 
National Policy Panel established by the UNA-USA. It gives recommendations of 
admitting Mainland China to the UN with a brief look at the reasons why. 
U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the 
Period 1944-l 949. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949 . Good on 
documentation during the five years preceding the takeover by the Communists. 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Policy With Respect to Mainland China. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. This is a verbatim copy of the 
hearings held between March 8 and 30 of 1966, during the second session of the 89th 
Congress. A similar set of hearings was held beginning June 24, 1971, by the 92nd 
Congress, first session. Proceedings from this four day series of hearings will be in print 
very shortly. 
llll~ill~tt~i~m~r~l~l!~it~lllllll , 
3 1723 02115 6955 
